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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
ALBERT PFAFF, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
ETHEL MILLER PFAFF, 
Defendant and Appellant 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Albert Pfaff, plaintiff and respondent, brought this 
action to obtain a divorce on the ground of the defend-
ant's alleged cruelty, causing him great mental distress. 
Ethel Miller Pfaff, his wife, by her answer denied 
plaintiff's allegations of cruel treatment and of any 
ownership by him in a dwelling and three lots in Moultrie, 
Georgia, standing of record in her name, and claimed equal 
ownership with the plaintiff of the Oldsmobile sedan auto-
mobile mentioned in the pleadings. 
In her counterclaim she sought a divorce on the 
grounds of cruelty, wilful desertion and wilful neglect 
of the plaintiff to provide for her the common necess-
aries of life. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff was not 
entitled to a divorce and granted a divorce to the defend-
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ant on the ground of the plaintiff's wilful desertion of 
the defendant for more than one year; restored her former 
name of Miller; awarded her alimony for a period of six 
months at $127.50 per month; awarded her the dwelling 
and three lots in Georgia, and required the plaintiff to 
pay her attorney's fee and costs; and awarded the Olds-
mobile automobile to the plaintiff. 
This appeal is from the decree granting the divorce 
and requiring the plaintiff to pay her $765.00 only, in 
six monthly payments of $127.50. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE REAL ESTATE IN MOULTRIE, GEOR-
GIA, ALTHOUGH ACQUIRED BY THE DE-
FENDANT DURING COVERTURE, WAS 
OWNED BY HER ALONE, FREE OF ANY 
INTEREST OR CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF. 
There can be no controversy as to the exclusive 
ownership of the home and lots in Georgia by the de-
fendant. By her own sweat and tears she paid the price 
for that property and naturally took title in her own 
name. The money paid was her own earnings and an 
inheritance, and the balance due was paid by her assump-
tion of a mortgage on the premises held by the Federal 
Land Bank. (Tr. 15) The money sent to the defendant 
by the plaintiff was the living allowance which he as a 
member of the Armed Forces was obligated to make for 
his wife. She testified (Tr. 22) that the allotment was 
$100.00 per month. From "running a cafe", together 
with an inheritance which she drew in the sum of $500.00 
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from her mother's estate, she accumulated approximately 
$1,600.00, which she used as a down payment on the 
Moultrie property. At the time of the trial she testified 
that she still owed $800.00 on the property (Tr. 24), on 
which balance she is paying monthly instalments. 
For two years she waited for him to come home; 
"I was alone looking for him every day, waiting for him 
to come home ... I wanted the fryers for him." (Tr 36) 
The appellant's position is that the Court was in 
error in finding as a fact (Finding No.7) that the parties 
(both) were owners of a home and three lots in Moultrie, 
Georgia, and this the appellant asserts as an abuse of the 
court's descretion and not based on facts established by 
competent or any evidence. If this be so, then the only 
relief granted to the defendant was the requirement that 
the plaintiff should pay her $127.50 per month for a 
period of six months only. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD OF ALIMONY IS INADE-
QUATE, INEQUITABLE AND UNJUST. 
The equities and peculiar circumstances of the case 
warrant the appellate court in exercising its own judg-
ment in regard to the trial court's complete termination 
of all support to the defendant at the end of six months, 
irrespective of the trial court's findings. The allowance of 
$127.50 for six months only was grossly inadequate and 
is unjust, and equity and justice require that this court 
interfere. 
The rule is stated in the following language quoted 
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from the case of Dahlberg v. Dahlberg, 77 Utah 157, at 
page 162: 
"We think the rule contended for by the plaintiff 
is the correct rule, and is in line with the later 
cases from this jurisdiction." 
The rule referred to is -
" ... that the kind of division or the amount of 
an allowance to be made is dependent upon the 
facts, circumstances, and conditions of each par-
ticular case, and, if upon a consideration of them 
the division or allowance as made by the court 
below is inadequate or unjust, this court is justi-
fied, and it is its duty to interfere, and that, to do 
so, it is not essential to show an abuse of discre-
tion in the court below, that it is enough, if upon 
the record presented, the court below erred in 
making the division or allowance and that equity 
and justice require an interference and a modifi-
cation thereof ... Of course, the rights and equi-
ties of both parties are to be considered, but, what-
ever doubt there may be concerning the matter, 
it ought to be resolved against the guilty party 
whose fault and wrongs and breaches of the mar-
ital relation destroyed the home and forced or 
brought about the separation." 
Further, at page 164: 
"The question thus is as to whether on the facts 
found the division and allowance were equitable 
and just. As to that, a divorce proceeding being 
an action in equity, the parties, under our Con-
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stitution, are entitled to our judgment, as well 
as that of the trial court." 
In the case of Hendricks v Hendricks, 91 Utah 533, 
at page 558, this court said: 
"It is likewise well settled in this state that where 
the appeal is on the question of the propriety 
of the judgment for alimony, this court is required 
to review the evidence in the nature of a trial de 
novo on the record, and the appellant is entitled 
to the judgment of this court, as well as the trial 
court, on this question. 
"It has further been determined by this court, as 
shown in the above cases, and cases therein cited, 
that it is not necessary for this court to find a 
gross abuse of discretion on the part of the trial 
court before modifying the judgment as to ali-
mony and that no general rule as to the amount 
of alimony can be laid down to follow in all cases, 
but the decree in each case must be determined 
upon the facts, the conditions, and the circum-
stances of the parties in each particular case, and 
that if, upon examination of the record, this court 
is convinced that the award in the trial court is 
inequitable and unjust, it should direct such decree 
as it finds to be just and equitable. The amount 
of alimony is measured by the wife's needs and 
requirements, considering her station in life, and 
upon the husband's ability to pay." 
In the case of Openshaw v Openshaw, 80 Utah 9, 
at pages 18 and 19, this court said: 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
". . . It is an ancient doctrine of the common 
law that it is the duty of a husband to support 
his wife. Such is still the law of this state, des-
pite the many changes which have been made 
in modern times in the law respecting the civil 
and political status of married women. This duty 
of support does not end when the marriage is 
dissolved by a decree of divorce rendered at the 
suit of the wife for the husband's matrimonial 
wrongs; but it continues so long as they both shall 
live, the wife remains unmarried and needs such 
support, and the husband is able to provide the 
same. (Italics supplied) It is measured by the 
wife's reasonable needs and requirements, con-
sidering her condition and station in life, and the 
husband's ability to pay." 
In the case of Hampton v Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 
at page 572, this court reaffirms the rule that it is not 
necessary for this court to find a gross abuse of discretion 
on the part of the trial court before modifying the judg-
ment as to alimony, and 
"that no general rule as to the amount of alimony 
can be laid down to follow in all cases, but the 
decree in each case must be determined upon the 
facts, the conditions, and circumstances of the 
parties in each particular case, and that if, upon 
examination of the record, this court is convinced 
that the award in the trial court is inequitable and 
unjust, then this court should direct such decree 
as it finds to be just and equitable. The amount 
of alimony is measured by the wife's needs and 
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requirements considering her station in life and 
upon the husband's ability to pay." (Italics 
supplied) 
CONCLUSION 
Certainly, when the wife is forced by the miscon-
duct of the husband to seek separation, she ought to 
receive sufficient support for her maintenance, regardless 
of her ability to work and contribute to her own support, 
as stated in the Dahlberg case, supra. 
The review is in effect a trial de novo on the record. 
Appellant asks for additional counsel fees for the 
prosecution of this appeal, and her costs on appeal. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed and the case remanded 
for further trial and disposition, as this court may de-
termine. 
JOSEPH E. EVANS, 
Suite 517 Eccles Building, 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
